Supreme Court Draws the Line on Reverse Burden: Unreliable Child Testimony Cannot Trigger POCSO Presumption of Guilt

In a significant ruling on criminal justice standards under the POCSO Act, the Supreme Court of India has held that the presumption of guilt under Section 29 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 does not automatically arise merely because a child victim has testified especially where such testimony is found unreliable or inconsistent. The judgment reaffirms that even in child sexual offence cases, statutory presumptions cannot replace the prosecution’s duty to first establish foundational facts through credible evidence.

The ruling came in Debraj Dutta v. State of West Bengal & Anr., where the Supreme Court restored the acquittal of the accused after finding that the Calcutta High Court had wrongly reversed the trial court’s decision by invoking Section 29 without adequate factual basis. The appellant, a tuition teacher, had been accused of sexual assault by a child student. While the trial court acquitted him citing evidentiary doubts, the High Court later convicted him under a lesser POCSO offence. The Supreme Court has now overturned that conviction.

Under Section 29 POCSO, once a person is prosecuted for certain offences under Sections 3, 5, 7, or 9 of the Act, the court shall presume guilt unless the contrary is proved. However, courts have consistently clarified that this reverse burden applies only after the prosecution proves foundational facts such as the occurrence of the incident, identity of the accused, and credible circumstances connecting the accused to the offence.

In the present case, the Supreme Court found multiple circumstances weakening the prosecution version, including delay in lodging the FIR, absence of medical examination, contradictions in witness testimony, and lack of corroborative surrounding evidence. The Court held that where the child’s testimony does not inspire confidence, Section 29 cannot be mechanically invoked to convict.

Importantly, the judgment does not dilute child protection law. Courts have repeatedly held that the sole testimony of a child victim can sustain conviction if it is clear, consistent, and trustworthy. What the ruling clarifies is that credibility remains central, even in statutes containing presumptions. 

The decision has major implications for POCSO trials, appellate review, evidentiary standards, and due process jurisprudence. It balances the need to protect children with the equally vital principle that criminal conviction must rest on reliable proof.

The broader constitutional message is clear: special laws may shift burdens, but they cannot dispense with fairness, scrutiny, and credible evidence.